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Article
Introduction
A worldview is a narrative in terms of which we relate to 
ourselves and reality at large. It is a kind of cultural operating 
system that gives us tentative answers to foundational ques-
tions such as “What are we?” “What is the nature of reality?” 
“What is the purpose of life?” and so on (Kastrup, 2014). 
Although many different worldviews vie for dominance 
today, the academically endorsed physicalist narrative 
defines the mainstream, despite its many difficulties 
(Kastrup, 2014, 2015; Nagel, 2012). This reigning world-
view posits that physical entities outside consciousness are 
the building blocks of reality. Consciousness, in turn, is sup-
posedly an epiphenomenon or emergent property of certain 
complex arrangements of these entities. As such, under phys-
icalism, consciousness must be reducible to physical arrange-
ments outside and independent of experience (Stoljar, 2016).
Physicalism is often portrayed as a worldview that, in 
contrast to, for example, religion or spirituality, is based 
solely on objective facts. The present article, however, 
hypothesizes that the formative principles and motivations 
underpinning the physicalist narrative—whether it ultimately 
turns out to be philosophically correct or not—are partly sub-
jective, reflecting neurotic ego-defense maneuvers meant, as 
described by Vaillant (1992), to “protect the individual from 
painful emotions, ideas, and drives” (p. 3). This becomes 
clear when one lifts core concepts of depth psychology to the 
social and cultural spheres. However, as a mostly clinical 
approach, depth psychology requires some elaboration 
before being applied at a theoretical level.
The modern understanding of depth psychology can be 
traced back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in the 
works of Frederic Myers, Pierre Janet, William James, 
Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung (Kelly et al., 2009). Its foun-
dational inference is that the human psyche comprises two 
main parts a conscious and an “unconscious” segment. The 
conscious segment of the psyche comprises experiences a 
person has introspective access to and can report. According 
to the analytical school of depth psychology, the “ego” is 
defined as the experiential center of this segment (von Franz, 
1964, p. 161), and it is in this specific sense that I use the 
word “ego” throughout the present article. In contrast, the 
so-called “unconscious” segment of the psyche comprises 
mental contents the person has no introspective access to and 
cannot report. Nonetheless, depth psychologists assert that 
“unconscious” mental contents can, and do, influence the 
person’s manifest thoughts, feelings, and behaviors.
Because the ability to report an experience is a metacog-
nitive capacity on top of the experience itself (Schooler, 
2002), a more rigorous articulation of the difference 
between the conscious and “unconscious” segments of the 
psyche is this: Conscious mental contents are those a per-
son both experiences and knows that he or she experiences 
them. “Unconscious” mental contents, on the other hand, 
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are those the person either does not experience or does not 
know that he or she experiences them (Kastrup, 2014, pp. 
104-110). In other words, conscious mental contents fall 
within the field of self-reflection and, therefore, can be 
reported, whereas “unconscious” mental contents escape 
this field and, therefore, cannot be reported. Indeed, the 
existence of mental contents that are experienced but can-
not be reported—even to oneself—is now well established 
in neuroscience, which has prompted the emergence of so-
called “no-report paradigms” (Tsuchiya, Wilke, Frässle, & 
Lamme, 2015).
However, as clinical psychologists can only gauge con-
sciousness based on what their patients report, anything 
outside the field of self-reflection is indistinguishable 
from true unconsciousness. This explains the somewhat 
inaccurate terminology choice of the founders of depth 
psychology.
Some critics have questioned the existence of an “uncon-
scious” segment of the psyche on philosophical grounds 
(Stannard, 1980, pp. 51-81). However, recent empirical 
results in neuroscience show the presence of broad cognitive 
activity that individuals cannot report, but which nonetheless 
causally conditions the individuals’ manifest thoughts, feel-
ings, or behaviors (Augusto, 2010; Eagleman, 2011; Westen, 
1999). Recent neuroimaging studies of the psychedelic state 
have also corroborated the depth-psychological view that 
ego suppression—in the form of reduction of neural activity 
in the brain’s default mode network—brings otherwise 
“unconscious” mental contents into awareness (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2012; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Palhano-
Fontes et al., 2015).
On the basis of these empirical results, the core idea of 
depth psychology—that is, that a segment of the psyche that 
escapes self-reflective introspection can causally condition 
our thoughts, feelings, and behaviors—cannot be dismissed. 
And because cultural narratives are the compound result of 
an aggregation of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of 
individuals, depth-psychological insights are valid starting 
points for an analysis of the psychological underpinnings of 
our culture’s mainstream worldview.
In the “Ego Protection Through Projection” and “Egoic 
Control” sections, I review ways in which the physicalist 
narrative can give us permission to avoid confronting 
unwanted affects in the “unconscious” segment of our 
psyche. In “The Question of Meaning” section, I elaborate 
on how physicalism can conceivably even nurture its propo-
nents’ sense of meaning in life. This latter section is based on 
theories of social psychology, rather than depth psychology, 
but it still leverages the notion of an “unconscious”: In 
hypothesizing that physicalism is an expression of fluid 
compensation, it presupposes that cognitive processes out-
side the field of self-reflection influence the feelings, 
thoughts, and opinions subjects express. Finally, the 
“Conclusion” section briefly sums up the key ideas defended 
in this article.
Ego Protection Through Projection
According to depth psychology, a neurosis is the expression 
of an inner psychic conflict caused by the ego’s refusal to 
acknowledge, confront, and ultimately integrate unwanted 
affects rising from the “unconscious” (Jung, 2014, p. 137). 
To keep these affects at bay, the ego uses a variety of defense 
mechanisms, among which denial, distortion, dissociation, 
repression, and so on (Vaillant, 1992). A particularly com-
mon defense mechanism is projection (Vaillant, 1992), 
whereby one circumvents the need to confront ego-threaten-
ing forces within oneself by ascribing the corresponding 
attributes to the outer environment. As such, projections can 
be said to partly hijack and manipulate one’s worldview in an 
attempt to prevent short-term suffering. My hypothesis is 
that, through projection, the physicalist worldview gives us 
permission to avoid confronting some of what we find dis-
agreeable within ourselves. This can be achieved in a variety 
of subtle ways.
For instance, we all have a sense of our own existence and 
identity. Lucid introspection reveals that the root of this 
sense is our consciousness—our capacity to be subjects of 
experience. After all, if we were not conscious, what could 
we know of ourselves? How could we even assert our own 
existence? Being conscious is what it means to be us. In an 
important sense—perhaps even the only important sense—
we are first and foremost consciousness itself, the rest of our 
self-image arising afterward, as thoughts and images con-
structed in consciousness.
From this perspective, the physicalist narrative’s attempt 
to reduce consciousness to physical entities outside subjec-
tivity is counterintuitive, for it divorces the alleged nature of 
consciousness from our felt sense of identity. We do not feel 
as though we were a bunch of physical particles bouncing 
around inside our skull. Instead, we feel that we are the sub-
jective “space” wherein our experiences unfold, including 
our ideas about physical particles. Hence, there is a sense in 
which the physicalist narrative can be said to project the felt 
essence of ourselves onto something distinctly other. 
According to it, we are not really “here,” grounded in our 
subjective sense of being, but somewhere “over there,” in an 
abstract world fundamentally beyond the felt concreteness of 
our inner lives. As such, the physicalist narrative entails an 
emptying out of what it means to be us, a kind of secular 
kenosis. “I am no ghost, just a shell,” laments the art charac-
ter Annlee (Huyghe & Parreno, 2003, p. 35), whose predica-
ment is that of many of us in contemporary society.
The kenosis entailed by the physicalist narrative can 
exonerate its proponents from responsibility for their choices 
and actions. Consider this passage by Sam Harris (2012), 
“Did I consciously choose coffee over tea? No. The choice 
was made for me by events in my brain that I . . . could not 
inspect or influence” (pp. 7-8, emphasis added). The projec-
tion of responsibility here is clear and the corresponding 
release described by Harris (2012) himself: “Losing a belief 
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in free will has not made me fatalistic—in fact, it has 
increased my feelings of freedom. My hopes, fears, and neu-
roses seem less personal” (p. 46, emphasis added). Indeed, 
under the ethos of such a worldview, there is no concrete 
reason for guilt or regret, for we allegedly are not what we 
experience ourselves to be. We are not responsible for what 
happens here because we are not—and have never been—
really here. We are not ghosts in the machine but ghosts con-
jured up by the machine. In a significant sense, we do not 
really exist.
As a matter of fact, some proponents of the physicalist 
narrative go as far as to deny that consciousness exists. 
“Consciousness doesn’t happen. It’s a mistaken construct.” 
These words of neuroscientist Michael Graziano (2016) 
should give anyone pause for thought. Here we have con-
sciousness—whatever it may intrinsically be—denying that 
consciousness exists. Philosopher Daniel Dennett (1991) 
also claimed that consciousness is an illusion, a claim that 
seems to immediately contradict itself. After all, where do 
illusions occur if not in consciousness? By appealing to 
metaphysical abstractions fundamentally beyond experi-
ence, such denials of our felt selves achieve a form of deliv-
erance somewhat analogous to religious absolution. 
Surprisingly, as we will later see, they even help restore a 
sense of meaningfulness in life, following what I will call 
“ontological trauma.”
The structure of these denials is fairly clear: First, con-
sciousness weaves the conceptual notion that certain aspects 
of its own dynamics somehow exist outside itself; then, it 
projects its own essence onto these aspects. The correspond-
ing dislocation of identity is apparent—and its neurotic char-
acter easy to grasp—with an analogy: Imagine a painter who, 
having painted a self-portrait, points at it and declares him-
self to be the portrait. This, in essence, is what physicalists 
do, whether it is philosophically justifiable or not. Their con-
sciousness conceptualizes self-portraits within itself. 
Sometimes these self-portraits take the form of electrical 
impulses and neurotransmitter releases in the brain (Koch, 
2004). Other times, they take the shape of quantum transi-
tions or potentials (Tarlaci & Pregnolato, 2015). Whatever 
the case, their consciousness always points to a conceptual 
entity it creates within itself and then declares itself to be this 
entity. It dismisses its own primary, first-person point of 
view in favor of an abstract third-person perspective. 
Consider Dennett’s (1991) words: “The way to answer these 
‘first-person point of view’ stumpers is to ignore the first-
person point of view and examine what can be learned from 
the third-person point of view” (p. 336, emphasis added). 
The contempt for the subject of experience—the primary 
datum of existence and one’s own felt identity—is palpable 
here; the kenosis nearly total.
The physicalist narrative may also give us permission to 
carve out and dismiss—again through the kenosis of projec-
tion—the most difficult aspects of our inner lives: our felt 
emotions. According to it, the feeling of an emotion is the 
internal perception of an “action program” triggered by cer-
tain stimuli (Damasio, 2011). Although the action program 
itself is important insofar as it helps us survive and repro-
duce, the accompanying feeling of emotion is, in a sense, a 
mere side effect of the program’s execution. For instance, the 
sight of another human being facing a predicament is a stim-
ulus that triggers actions meant to help the victim and, con-
sequently, increase the social cachet of the action taker. The 
feeling of compassion, in turn, is supposedly nothing but the 
inner perception of this evolutionarily useful reactive schema 
(Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009); it 
allegedly has no primary or fundamental significance. Under 
such a narrative, it is easier to go into denial about our emo-
tional lives when the going gets tough. We feel justified to 
dismiss or repress our traumas and demons, avoiding the 
often painful work of psychological integration. The physi-
calist narrative provides a foundation for rationalizing the 
choice of living an unexamined, superficial life. To a person 
desperate to avoid the specter of immediate and pungent suf-
fering, the benefits of this stance may seem to far outweigh 
its potential long-term implications.
Surprisingly, the physicalist narrative can even offer us 
reassurance about death. According to it, there is literally noth-
ing to fear about death itself, because it is allegedly the end of 
all experience, including the experiences of fear and pain. All 
of our problems and suffering are guaranteed to end at that 
point. The great and scary unknown of the experiential realm 
beyond physical existence vanishes in one fell swoop; the 
greatest angst of humankind is conquered. The psychological 
allure of this idea is powerful, yet most people do not seem to 
ever stop to consider it. We have come to take for granted the 
comforts that our mainstream worldview grants us.
To sum it up, by denying our felt sense of existence and 
identity, the physicalist narrative creates an opportunity to 
clear the ego of ultimate responsibility. By denying the fun-
damental reality of emotions, it creates an opportunity to 
protect the ego from a confrontation with far more powerful 
forces. And by projecting our ontological essence onto 
ephemeral arrangements of matter, it creates an opportunity 
to protect the ego from what has historically been the great-
est angst of humankind: the experiential unknown of the 
after-death state.
Egoic Control
It has been shown that religiosity can reflect a form of com-
pensatory control (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010): 
By believing that transcendent forces aligned with one’s con-
victions govern the world, the ego avoids the anxiety associ-
ated with its own inability to overcome uncertainty. This 
way, religiosity creates an opportunity for control by proxy: 
Although the ego cannot determine the course of nature, an 
external agency far superior to it is believed to do so in a way 
consistent with the ego’s preferences. The ego’s need to 
avoid anxiety by exerting control is thus indirectly fulfilled.
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Going beyond religiosity, the physicalist narrative enables 
a sense of direct egoic control over nature. Indeed, a recent 
empirical study has shown that “believing that science is or 
will prospectively grant . . . mastery of nature imbues indi-
viduals with the belief that they are in control of their lives” 
(Stavrova, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2016, p. 234). Of 
course, by associating itself with science—in a philosophi-
cally questionable move that is nonetheless widely 
accepted—the physicalist narrative has become the enabler 
and ontological foundation of this belief. And because direct 
control—the notion that one can personally steer or at least 
predict what is going to happen—is known to be a key con-
tributor to mental well-being (Langer & Rodin, 1976; Luck, 
Pearson, Maddem, & Hewett, 1999), it stands to reason that 
the allure of physicalism in this regard could potentially be 
even stronger than that of religious control-by-proxy.
The opportunity for direct control offered by the physical-
ist narrative goes as far as conquering death itself: If con-
sciousness is just an epiphenomenon or emergent property of 
physical arrangements outside experience, it becomes con-
ceivable that, through smart engineering, we could create 
means to upload our consciousness into more durable sub-
strates such as silicon computers (Kurzweil, 2005). Some 
physicalists even offer detailed roadmaps for achieving this 
(Sandberg & Boström, 2008). The possibility of eternal life 
thus seems to open up, provided that consciousness can be 
instantiated in a computer by programming the computer with 
the patterns of information flow found in a person’s brain.
This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation 
of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phe-
nomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against 
this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of 
which is perhaps John Searle’s (2004). To gain some intuition 
about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do 
we have any reason to believe that, by performing a perfectly 
accurate simulation of kidney function in a computer, the com-
puter will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an 
essential difference between a computer simulation and the 
phenomenon it simulates; they are not the same thing, no mat-
ter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to “upload 
consciousness” under the physicalist narrative seem to become 
so engrossed in abstraction that they lose touch with basic 
intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis is, in this sense, com-
parable with religious dogmatism.
Although both the religious and physicalist narratives cre-
ate an opportunity for conquering death, the Promethean 
door to immortality opened by physicalism invests the ego—
not deities—with the power to control transcendence through 
technology. This is seductively more direct, its only weak-
ness—from a psychological standpoint—being that it is 
promissory: At present, nobody has ever managed to upload 
consciousness. Yet, some popular physicalist authors argue 
that consciousness uploading may be achievable still in our 
own lifetime (Kurzweil, 2005; Sandberg & Boström, 2008), 
which actualizes the potential allure of their worldview.
As seen in the “Ego Protection Through Projection” sec-
tion and this section, the implications of the physicalist nar-
rative consistently help protect and invest the ego with 
authority. This is not to say that physicalism is entirely moti-
vated by neurotic ego-defense maneuvers, for there is a 
philosophical argument behind it that cannot be dismissed. 
Nonetheless, the question is whether it is plausible that 
physicalism’s significant ego-defense potential has not 
been, to some degree, an unexamined motivation for its 
development, promotion, and adoption.
The Question of Meaning
Meaning—in the sense of significance and purpose—is prob-
ably the greatest asset any human being can possess. 
Psychotherapist Victor Frankl (1991), who practiced and led 
groups while detained in a concentration camp during World 
War II, asserted that the will-to-meaning is the most dominant 
human drive, in contrast to Nietzsche’s will-to-power and 
Freud’s will-to-pleasure. Meaning is so powerful that, as Jung 
remarked (1995), it “makes a great many things endurable—
perhaps everything” (p. 373). Philip K. Dick’s alter ego 
Horselover Fat, in the novel Valis, embodies the essence of 
this drive: “Fat had no concept of enjoyment; he understood 
only meaning,” wrote Dick (2001, p. 92). Like Fat, many of 
us see meaning as a higher value than power or pleasure. Our 
motivation to live rests in there being meaning in our lives. 
Today, we need meaning more than ever, for as Paul Tillich 
(1952) lucidly observed, the greatest anxieties of our culture 
are precisely those of doubt and meaninglessness.
And here is where an argument is often made for the 
impartiality of physicalism: as a worldview that, by turning 
the universe into a mechanical contraption fueled by mere 
chance, drains the meaning out of life, it cannot possibly be a 
neurotic ego-defense mechanism—or so the argument goes. 
Instead, the physicalist narrative must represent a courageous 
admission by “tough people who face the bleak facts” (Watts, 
1989, p. 65). It must embody an objective assessment of real-
ity, not an emotional, irrational wish-fulfillment maneuver 
akin to religion. Compelling as it may seem at first, this argu-
ment fails careful scrutiny, for its premise is false.
Indeed, according to the Meaning Maintenance Model 
(MMM) of social psychology (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 
2006)—which is perhaps better seen in the context of a 
broader theory of psychological defense (Hart, 2013)—we 
can derive a sense of meaning from four different sources: 
self-esteem, closure, belonging, and symbolic immortality. 
In other words, we can find meaning in life through (a) culti-
vating a feeling of personal worth, (b) resolving doubts and 
ambiguities, (c) being part of something bigger and longer 
lasting than ourselves, and (d) leaving something of signifi-
cance behind—such as professional achievements—in the 
form of which we can “live on” after physical death. A soci-
ety’s mainstream cultural narrative conditions how meaning 
can be derived from each of these four sources.
by guest on November 2, 2016Downloaded from 
Kastrup 5
The key idea behind the MMM is that of fluid compensa-
tion as an ego-defense mechanism: If one of the four sources 
of meaning is threatened, an individual will tend to automati-
cally compensate by seeking extra meaning from the other 
three sources. For instance, threats to self-esteem may cause 
the individual to reaffirm his or her model of reality, thereby 
bolstering closure.
As Van Tongeren and Green (2010) have shown, a tran-
scendent source of meaning, such as religion, plays the same 
role in fluid compensation as the other four sources. For 
instance, individuals tend to reaffirm their religious beliefs 
following disruption to their meaning system, in an effort to 
protect the latter. Van Tongeren’s and Green’s experiments 
have not only empirically substantiated the MMM, they have 
also shown that even subliminal threats to meaning trigger 
fluid compensation, strongly indicating that the “uncon-
scious” is integral to the process.
With this as background, my suggestion is that the physi-
calist narrative, in addition to being a rational hypothesis for 
making sense of the world, may be an expression of fluid 
compensation by intellectual elites. In other words, instead 
of a threat to meaning, the physicalist narrative may actually 
reflect an attempt by these elites to protect and restore their 
sense of meaning through bolstering closure, self-esteem, 
and symbolic immortality. The disruption that may have 
originally led to this compensatory move occurred around 
the mid- to late 19th century.
Indeed, it was at that time that we lost our ability to spon-
taneously relate to religious myths without linear intellectual 
scrutiny. “With Descartes and Kant, the philosophical rela-
tion between Christian belief and human rationality had 
grown ever more attenuated. By the late nineteenth century, 
with few exceptions, that relation was effectively absent,” 
wrote Tarnas (2010, p. 311). The myths that had hitherto 
offered us meaning through the promise of literal immortal-
ity and metaphysical teleology became untenable. Taylor 
(2007), who richly chronicled this historical transition, char-
acterized the corresponding loss of meaning rather broadly 
and generally as “a wide sense of malaise at the disenchanted 
world, a sense of it as flat, empty” (p. 302). He even hinted at 
fluid compensation when speaking of “a multiform search 
for something within, or beyond [the world], which could 
compensate for the meaning lost with transcendence” 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 302).
While acknowledging that this generalized malaise was 
the matrix of what followed, I submit that a more specific, 
forceful, and personal threat to meaning was necessary to 
mobilize the extraordinary level of academic and intellectual 
endorsement amassed by physicalism. After all—as Taylor 
himself described through what he called “the nova effect”—
the malaise, in and by itself, fostered not only physicalism 
but also an explosion of myriad other worldviews.
I hypothesize that a profound and disturbing change in the 
intellectual elites’ understanding of the nature of their own 
being—that is, an ontological trauma—was the specific, 
forceful, and personal trigger that helped congeal the physi-
calist narrative. Having lost religion, the elites were left with 
the prospect of physical deterioration without the path to 
transcendence previously offered by an immortal soul. 
Hence, they were forced to face the inexorability of their 
own approaching death. And as we know from Terror 
Management Theory, mortality salience is a formidable 
threat to meaning (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 
1997) empirically shown to motivate investment in palliative 
worldviews (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Ontological 
trauma may have thus triggered fluid compensation and ulti-
mately led to the intellectual elites’ championing of the phys-
icalist narrative.
Indeed, many studies have shown that mortality salience 
leads to a heightened need for closure (Landau et al., 2004). 
This is fluid compensation in action. Notice also that the 
physicalist narrative is humanity’s most significant attempt 
yet to achieve closure in our worldview. As multibillion dol-
lar experiments like the Large Hadron Collider—whose pri-
mary purpose is to “close” the Standard Model of particle 
physics, with no immediate practical applications—illus-
trate, physicalism embodies an unprecedented effort to pro-
duce a causally complete, unambiguous model of reality. 
Nothing else in millennia of preceding history has come any-
where near it. I suggest that this is not coincidental: The 
physicalist narrative may reflect the elites’ ego’s attempt to 
regain, through heightened closure, the meaning it lost along 
with religion. Moreover, other modalities of fluid compensa-
tion may be at play here as well: By distinguishing them-
selves as a segment of society uniquely capable to understand 
facts and concepts beyond the cognitive capacity of others, 
the scientists and academics who promote the physicalist 
narrative stand to gain in self-esteem. The cosmological 
scope of the scientific work they produce and leave behind 
upon their deaths can also be seen as a boost to symbolic 
immortality. Finally, recall Tillich’s observation: Doubt and 
meaninglessness anxiety dominate our culture’s mind-set. Is 
it humanly plausible that our mainstream narrative would 
have evolved to tackle only doubt and leave meaninglessness 
anxiety unaddressed?
All in all, the physicalist narrative does not necessarily 
represent a net loss of meaning for the intellectual elites who 
produced and continue to promote it. The transcendent mean-
ing lost along with religion may be compensated for by an 
increase in closure, self-esteem, and symbolic immortality. 
Unfortunately, however, this compensatory strategy cannot 
work for most ordinary people: The men and women on the 
streets do not have enough grasp of contemporary scientific 
theories to experience an increase in their sense of closure. 
Neither do they gain in self-esteem, because they are not part 
of the distinguished elites. Finally, insofar as ordinary people 
do not produce scientific work of their own, no particular 
gain in symbolic immortality is to be expected either.
In conclusion, the physicalist narrative may serve the 
egoic meaning needs of the intellectual elites who develop 
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and promote it, but constitutes a significant threat to the sense 
of meaning of the average person on the streets. Perhaps for 
this reason, a large segment of society seeks meaning through 
alternative ontologies considered outdated and untenable by 
the intellectual elites, such as religious dualism (Heflick, 
Goldenberg, Hart, & Kamp, 2015). This creates a schism—
with corresponding tensions—between different segments of 
society, which may help explain the contemporary conflict 
between neo-atheism and religious belief.
Conclusion
The physicalist narrative, in contrast to the way it is normally 
portrayed, may not be dispassionate. It may be partly driven 
by the neurotic endeavor to project onto the world attributes 
that help us avoid confronting unacknowledged aspects of 
our own inner lives. Moreover, contrary to what most people 
assume, physicalism creates an opportunity for the intellec-
tual elites who develop and promote it to maintain a sense of 
meaning in their own lives through fluid compensation. 
However, because this compensatory strategy does not apply 
to a large segment of society, it creates a schism—with cor-
responding tensions—that may help explain the contempo-
rary conflict between neo-atheism and religious belief.
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